Reynold Vs. US.

Issue: Does petitioner have standing to challenge the Attorney General's interim rule making the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act retroactively applicable to those who committed their underlying offenses prior to its enactment date?

The case I was given was Reynolds vs. Us, and the case went before the Supreme Court on October 3, 2011. The constitutional question surrounding the case is does Mr. Reynolds have standing under the reading of the S.O.R.N.A. statute to raise claims concerning the attorney general's Interim rule. As well as does S.O.R.N.A. Violate the Constitution and should this Court hear Billy Joe Reynolds' case to resolve conflicting court opinions concerning the commerce clause, the ex post facto clause and due process?

            If you’re wondering what S.O.R.N.A its sex offender registration and notification act which is Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-248). SORNA requires sex offenders to register and notify the United States. To summarize the case, “Billy Joe Reynolds became a convicted sex offender Missouri in 2001 and sentenced to imprisonment.  Upon his release in 2005, he registered under Missouri law and subsequently updated and verified his registration as required by Missouri law. In November 2007, Reynolds was charged and indicted with violating SORNA’s registration requirements after he moved to Pennsylvania without updating his registration. Reynolds tried to dismiss the indictment saying that the Attorney General’s rule violated the APA. The district court denied the motion, and Reynolds entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.  The Third Circuit affirmed, ruling that SORNA’s registration requirements applied to pre-enactment offenders by their own force, even without the additional rule by the Attorney General.” Above was quoted from the scouts blog.” To put this into plain language Reynolds committed a sex crime before the SORNA ruling was enacted but section 1613(d) of the act says the attorney general has the authority to say whether and how the requirements apply to sex offenders that committed crimes before the act was created. The only problem with this is that Reynolds argues that this means that the Attorney General gets to say whether they apply at all.  He also claims that the second clause contradicts the language of the first clause. It give the attorney general the authorization to prescribe rules meaning the attorney general get to say how they are applied.

            The government/ court argues that the plain language of SORNA’s registration requirements means that all sex offenders, including pre-enactment offenders, must register.  The court also argues that it says that SORNA’s delegation to the Attorney General to is just to establish how it applies. The registration requirements further suggests that the SORNA’s requirements apply by their own force. The court also argues that the case is temporary and unimportant because this only applies to a small amount of sex offender that committed crimes before the act. And even after the ruling, either way, won’t affect the ability of pre-enforcement offenders to challenge registration requirements under SORNA.

            The decision has not yet been made on the case although I feel like its more than likely that the court will not rule in the favor of Reynolds